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God

God

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In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of a god.^[1] The problem is most often discussed in the context of the personal god of the Abrahamic religions, but is also relevant to polytheistic traditions involving many gods. A proposed solution to this dilemma is called a theodicy.

History

Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt

The problem of evil takes at least four formulations in ancient Mesopotamian religious thought, as in the extant manuscripts of Ludlul bēl nēmeqi (I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom), Erra and Ishum, The Babylonian Theodicy, and The Dialogue of Pessimism.^[2] In this type of polytheistic context, the chaotic nature of the world implies multiple gods battling for control. In ancient Egypt, it was thought the problem takes at least two formulations, as in the extant manuscripts of Dialogue of a Man with His Ba and The Eloquent Peasant. Due to the conception of Egyptian gods as being far removed, these two formulations of the problem focus heavily on the relation between evil and people; that is, moral evil.

Epicurus

Epicurus is generally credited with first expounding the problem of evil, and it is sometimes called "the Epicurean paradox" or "the riddle of Epicurus." In this form, the argument is not really a paradox or a riddle, but rather a reductio ad absurdum of the premises.^[3] Epicurus drew the conclusion that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of the Gods who care about the matters of mankind, assuming absolute concepts of benevolence, knowledge, and power. More generally, no paradox or problem exists for those who do not accept the premises, in particular the existence of a benevolent god or Gods. However, many Greeks did; Plato, in his "Timaeus," states gods are good.

Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world? — Epicurus, as quoted in 2000 Years of Disbelief

Epicurus himself did not leave any written form of this argument. It can be found in Lucretius's "De Rerum Natura" and in Christian theologian Lactantius's "Treatise on the Anger of God" where Lactantius critiques the argument.

Epicurus's argument as presented by Lactantius actually argues that a god that is all powerful and all good does not exist and that the gods are distant and uninvolved with man's concerns. The gods are neither our friends nor enemies. The stronger form most people know of Epicurus' problem of evil is actually David Hume's formulation of the problem of evil in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:

"[Gods] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?"

Marcion, the 2nd century sect leader is presented by Tertullian in his "Adversus Marcion" as presenting this puzzle: "why does God who is all powerful and has foreknowledge of the future allow evil?" Marcion's answer is that god is in part evil himself.

Traditional Judeo-Christian Interpretations

The biblical Book of Job is, perhaps, the most widely known formulation of the problem of evil in Western thought. Other books of note include Psalms 1 and 82, and Ecclesiastes (Koheleth).

Augustine and Pelagius

In the 5th Century, Pelagius denied the Augustianian answer to the paradox of original sin. Augustine's answer was the Limited Sovereignty argument, which stated that Adam and Eve had the power to change nature by bringing sin into the world, but that the advent of sin then limited mankind’s power thereafter (to evade the consequences). The problem of evil then asks: "Is God's creation still good?" Pelagius argued that death is a natural part of the universe. Both he and John Chrysostom believed that Christians, through their baptism, are free to make moral choices; that, although their wills cannot affect the course of nature, it can — and must — affect their moral decisions. This view, however, does not exclude the possibility that death came about as a result of human action. Pelagius' main argument was that God is just, and it would be unjust to punish many people for the sin of two people. Adam and Eve sinned, but universal mortality cannot be the result of their sin alone. Mortality must be the result of some other cause, which Pelagius held was simply the structure of nature. Pelagius' position is regarded by most Christian denominations as a heresy.^[4] Augustine's position on the issue is discussed further in the section on Criticisms and responses below.

Apocatastasis

Origen, an early Christian scholar and theologian, suggested that the problem of evil was a misnomer. Origen's response to this was the concept of Apocatastasis. Simply stated, the ends justify the means. That is, all of creation is reconciled by its purpose of facilitating freewill. This argument is still prevalent in Eastern Orthodoxy today. The concept can be traced in the works of St Clement of Alexandria, St Isaac of Syria, St Gregory of Nyssa, St Gregory the Great and St Maximus the Confessor. Modern versions of the argument can be found in some of the writings of Dostoevsky (see the Devil's conversation with Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov and in Stepan Verkhovensky's play in The Possessed) though Dostoevsky himself never expressed his endorsement of the idea.

Formalized arguments

One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil presented by Epicurus may be schematized as follows (this form of the argument is called 'the inconsistent triad'):

1. If a perfectly good god exists, then there is no evil in the world.
2. There is evil in the world.
3. Therefore, a perfectly good god does not exist.

This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world". Other logical forms of arguments articulating the problem follow. The problem with this is that it assumes that God is somehow unable to exist with evil, but most religious texts on the description of God and evil say otherwise, one example is the Book of Job.

Logical problem of evil

1. God exists. (premise)
2. God is omnipotent and omniscient. (premise — or true by definition of the word "God")
3. God is all-benevolent. (premise — or true by definition)
4. All-benevolent beings are opposed to all evil. (premise — or true by definition)
5. All-benevolent beings who can eliminate evil will do so immediately when they become aware of it. (premise)
6. God is opposed to all evil. (conclusion from 3 and 4)
7. God can eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 2)
8. Whatever the end result of suffering is, God can bring it about by ways that do not include suffering. (conclusion from 2)
9. God has no reason not to eliminate evil. (conclusion from 7.1)
10. God has no reason not to act immediately. (conclusion from 5)
11. God will eliminate evil completely and immediately. (conclusion from 6, 7.2 and 7.3)
12. Evil exists, has existed, and probably will always exist. (premise)
13. Items 8 and 9 are contradictory; therefore, one or more of the premises is false: either God does not exist, evil does not exist, or God is not simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent (i.e. God is omnipotent and omniscient but not all-benevolent, omnipotent and all-benevolent but not omniscient, or omniscient and all-benevolent but not omnipotent).

Evidential problem of evil

As argued by Paul Draper in a seminal article in Noûs (1989), the evidental problem of evil goes as follows:

1. Gratuitous evils exist.
2. The hypothesis of indifference (HI), i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
3. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.

Argument from evil natural laws and processes

1. A god is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-benevolent.
2. If a god exists, then there exist no instances of an ultimately evil natural laws or processes.
3. The laws of predation are ultimately evil.
4. There are instances of the laws of predation.
5. Therefore, no god exists.

Moral argument from evil

1. The most rational theists believe (i.e. roughly speaking, have a belief) that God exists.
2. If a god exists, then there is objective justification for every actual instance of evil (even if no-one intervenes to prevent that evil).
3. For any possible world W, if a god exists in W, then every instance of evil in W is objectively justified.
4. If a god exists, then there is an objective justification for every actual instance of evil, (including those evils where there is a witness).
5. Some members of the class of most rational theists (as defined above) are theists who believe(2).
6. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) know that there is objective justification for any actual instance of evil, justification that will occur even if no onlooker intervenes to stop or prevent that evil.
7. If human person P knows that there is objective justification for evil E, and that this justification will occur even if P does not intervene to stop or prevent E, then P is morally justified in allowing E to occur.
8. Some of the most rational theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any actual evil to occur. (from 4 and 5)
9. If the most rational theists know that a god exists, then some of those theists (namely, those who know 2) are morally justified in allowing any evil to occur. (from 1 to 6)
10. Even the most rational theists (including those who know 2) are not morally justified in allowing just any evil to occur.
11. Even the most rational theists do not know that a god exists. (from 7 and 8)
12. If the most rational theists do not know that a god exists, then no theist knows that a god exists.
13. No theist knows that a god exists. (from 9 and 10)
14. For any given theist, that theist's belief that a god exists is either false or unjustified.
15. If a god exists, then some theists are justified in believing that a god exists.
16. If a god exists, then no theist has a false belief that a god exists.
17. If a god exists, then some theists know (i.e., have a justified, true belief) that God exists. (from 13 and 14)
18. It is not the case that some theists know (i.e., have a justified and true belief) that a god exists. (from 12)
19. No god exists. (from 15 and 16)

Inductive argument from evil

1. All evil in the kinds of created entities are the result of the fallibility of one or more of its creators. (Premise)
2. The universe is a created entity. (Premise)
3. The universe contains evil. (Premise)
4. Evil is the result of the actions of a fallible creator(s) or is not the result of any creator(s). (From 1, 2 and 3 by predictive inference)
5. If god created the universe, then he is fallible. (From 4)
6. Therefore, god did not create the universe, is imperfect, or does not exist. (From 5)

Argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure

1. Consider the following observations:
2. * Moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful.
3. * Sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful.
4. * Sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful.
5. The observations in 1 are more probably the result of natural law than a god.
6. Therefore, probably no god exists.

Criticisms and responses

In Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, a well-known essay written in 1710, Leibniz introduced the term "theodicy" to describe the formal study of this subject. This term is also used for an explanation of why God permits evil to exist without it being a contradiction of his perfect goodness.

Definition of "evil"

The fifth century theologian Augustine of Hippo mounted what has become one of the most popular defences of the existence of God against the Epicurean paradox. He maintained that evil was only privatio boni, or a privation of good. An evil thing can only be referred to as a negative form of a good thing, such as discord, injustice, and loss of life or of liberty. If a being is not totally pure, evil will fill in any gaps in that being's purity. This is commonly called the Contrast Theodicy — that evil only exists as a "contrast" with good. However, the Contrast Theodicy relies on a metaphysical view of morality that few people, even theologians, agree with (that good and evil are not moral judgments). In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine also argued that Epicurus had ignored the potential benefits of suffering in the world.

"Evil" suggests a moral law

Another response to this paradox argues that asserting "evil exists" would imply a moral standard against which to define good and evil (see also Argument from morality). Therefore, by using this argument one implies the existence of a moral law, which requires a law-maker. Most theists would assert that this law-maker is God, whilst many atheists would argue that morality can just as easily be reached through reason — that this law is in fact a social contract agreed to by all humans; subconsciously developed from social prisoner's dilemma and/or that this problem is more accurately described as a problem of physical suffering, which can be objectively defined against a standard (of zero physical suffering), or that morality can be reached by its ability to support man's means to attain life.

Free will

Some theists argue that God allows evil to exist so that humans can have freedom of choice, to do good or evil, so that they are whole beings, and not mindless machines. The argument goes as follows:

• Free will requires the potential to do anything one chooses. (premise, or by definition)
• Thus, free will requires the potential to do evil.
• Thus, removing the potential to do evil would remove free will.

Another formulation of this premise is through the philosophical position of supernatural libertarianism — that humans possess a non-physical component to their psyches in which resides the faculty of free will. God's infinite and unsearchable wisdom found that it was better to create a being in the divine image — with free will — than to create a mere automaton or to create no being at all. Thus God is exonerated from creating evil because God merely created a being that had the possibility of evil, but also had the possibility of good.

One example criticism of the image of God awaiting, being put before an accomplished fact and reacting a posteriori, is the problem of eternity.

Some critics of this argument say that beings that are not omnipotent do not have freedom of choice in any case. But others say that free will should be understood as "wanting" and "trying" but not necessarily "getting". For example, not everyone has the ability to become a successful Major League Baseball player, even though they have the freedom to try. Isaiah Berlin famously identified this contrast as "positive" and "negative" liberty in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty. A different answer to this objection is that God, being omnipotent, is able to defer some level of potency to being created in the divine image.

Another argument is that the choices a person can make are determined by one's inherent nature. If someone were naturally good, he would still have some degree of free choice. Many people who have enjoyed this partial free will have lived their lives without causing suffering or other evil. Why wouldn't God make everyone predisposed to being good? Why would he make some who are predisposed to performing evil acts? However, this objection ignores the overall cosmological system in place by looking at the individual alone. The natural components of evil in humanity were endowed not by the creators by the past evil choices of other humans. In Christianity, this is akin to the concept of "original sin." God created humanity able to make choices. A totally free humanity chose evil. The human race retains free will but has a general disposition to chose evil as a result of those previous choices. In Christianity, the divine intervention of Christ has the ability to remove the effects of original sin and the individual is possessed with both the sinful nature and the influence of the indwelling redeemer to more freely choose.

The other side of this argument is that there "are no" naturally good people. All people are capable of both good and evil acts. An individual does either good or evil acts, depending not only on their inherent nature, but also upbringing, experiences, morals, choices, circumstances, society, and many other factors. The same group of people might be good or evil depending on the society they live in.

Additionally, some critics note that if God simply cannot create people that are both entirely good and enjoy free will, then he cannot be considered all-powerful. In other words, people's free will limits the creator's free will, makes a kind of plain fatum above him (and various possible options of creation). But, of course, if human free will and a world without evil are contradictory, then this would be no problem for the omnipotence of God. For he could not be expected to do the logically contradictory (such as create a married bachelor or create a round square; and in this case create an entirely good world where we have free will).

The free will defence, as it is called, does take at its heart the assumption that human free will and a world without evil are incompatible. Is this fair? It has been argued that it is not. Could God not create a world where humans can only freely do good? No this is a contradiction in terms. But could God not create a world where humans just happen to only freely do good? Proponents of the free will defence say that this too is an inconsistent proposition.

It has been argued that if one claims that this is a logical contradiction then one must also claim that all religions of a Judeo-Christian tradition are contradictory as well. For they do suggest that there are situations where there could be beings who freely only happen to do good. God is one such example — he is free; but would do no wrong. What about those in heaven — they are free, yet some claim that no evil would ever happen in heaven.^[5]. If you accept these examples, then you must accept that God could possibly have created a world where humans have free will and just happen only to do good (although they are perfectly free to do bad). But this view again is ignoring what the proponents of free will are suggesting. In Christian theology, after this life, the redeemed individual will be totally free from the ravages of original sin and predisposed to do good in the heavenly realm. But the original unblemished state without any predisposition to do evil or good was necessary for the original human creature to be truly free and not merely an automaton. The predisposition to do good through redemption is only introduced into the individual who embraces such an offer of grace by free will and is not imposed. This scheme is objectionable to divine sovereignty absolutists and other Christians whose theological traditions do not allow for any human choice in salvation, such as monosynergists.

The previous objection also ignores the duality of will and nature embraced by many modern proponents of free will. In a way that is admittedly beyond the comprehension of finite humanity, the divine nature is infinitely predisposed to do good but also is possessed of a free will. This may be because the nature of the cosmos is such that whatever the deity wills to do is therefore definable as good and our understanding of "good" is shaded by what God has done.

There are also many old paradoxes concerning the idea of free will. One of them is about "unfree will" and is connected with popular (and not academical) understanding of this term; it goes: in order for a change (e.g. in your will, i.e. intention) to be considered free, it must be already wanted. Why would ego change? (An academical, overdrawn example is the Buridan's ass: which however doesn't see that no action happens only when on both sides there is a danger; when on both sides there is an advantage, any randomness can decide.) Another problem: free will can turn to "I'm the cause (liable) of something that is uncaused". However, the most serious paradox, known for ages and currently treated e.g. by the Roman Church as being impossible to resolve with human mind, is the relation between free will and grace (or, saying philosophically, between "me" and the "world"). Is a will unrelated to anything really my will? Isn't it just randomness, chaos (whose definition is "something that cannot be predicted")? If it is, if there's some totally free area of choice, with all probabilities equal, one where I could as well toss a coin, then it turns out to be an infinite short frame of time, actually only one single moment and totally independent from anything. But this leads to fatalism, i.e. to the way of thought that everything what happens is inevitable; following this path of thinking, I don't have to be worried about grace, and even less need I worry how some random area will be in the future.

Ditheism

Ditheistic belief systems (a kind of dualism) resolved the problem of evil by positing that there are two rival great gods, that work in polar opposition to each other. Examples of such belief systems include Gnosticism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and in a way those currents of Christianity and Islam comprising the Devil, although the latter tend to define some kind of asymmetry between the two deities' capabilities. While the concept of omnipotence is difficult to hold in ditheistic belief systems, "asymmetrically ditheistic" belief systems as described above can't logically adhere to the omnipotence of one of the opposing forces as the omnipotent one then could simply rid itself of the other. Thus generally ditheistic believe system technically aren't even subject to the problem of evil.

Problem of evil in Hinduism

Main article: Problem of evil in Hinduism

In Hinduism, the problem of evil is present but does not exist per se as souls are eternal and not directly created by God. In Dvaita philosophy, jivas (souls) are eternally existent and hence not a creation of God ex nihilo (out of nothing). The souls are bound by beginningless avidya (ignorance) that cause a misidentification with products of nature (body, wealth, power) and hence suffering. In effect, Hinduism identifies avidya (ignorance) as the cause of evil and this ignorance itself is uncaused. Suffering from natural causes are explained as karmic results of previous births.

Moreover, even within the realm of avidya, "good" and "evil" are an individual's deeds and God dispenses the results of an individual's actions but has the power to mitigate suffering.(see Karma in Hinduism).

Problem of evil in Buddhism

The problem of evil is generally considered in Buddhism as a basis for not believing in a benevolent creator God. For instance, in the Bhûridatta Jataka^[6] the Bodhisattva sings:

If the creator of the world entire
They call God, of every being be the Lord
Why does he order such misfortune
And not create concord?

If the creator of the world entire
They call God, of every being be the Lord
Why prevail deceit, lies and ignorance
And he such inequity and injustice create?

If the creator of the world entire
They call God, of every being be the Lord
Then an evil master is he, (O Aritta)
Knowing what's right did let wrong prevail!

Problem of evil in Islam

Mutazilite view

Mu'tazilis identify evil as something that stems from free will and human imperfection, arguing that if man's evil acts were from the will of God then punishment would be meaningless. Mu'tazilis do not deny suffering from non-human sources such as natural disasters, and explain this "apparent" evil through the Islamic doctrine of taklif - that life is a test for beings possessing free will.

See also

• Apocatastasis
• Book of Job
• Devil
• The problem of Hell
• Tower of Siloam
• Qliphoth and Sephirah in Kabbalah
• The Problem of Pain
• Omnipotence paradox
• Existence of God
• Just-world phenomenon

Notes

References

• Beebe, James R. "Logical Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).
• Crouch, William, "Is there a defensible argument for the non-existence of God?," On Philosophy, James Nicholson (ed.).
• Farrer, Austin. Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961.
• Haught, James A. (1996). 2,000 Years of Disbelief: Famous People with the Courage to Doubt. Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-57392-067-3.
• Hein, David and Henderson, Edward, Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer. New York and London: Continuum / T & T Clark, 2004. 100–118.
• Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love, first edition. London: Macmillan, 1966.
• Mackie, J. L. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.
• Murray, Michael. "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977.
• Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
• Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
• Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• Trakakis , Nick. "Evidential Problem of Evil," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.).

External links

• The Riddle of Epicurus — Earliest known statement of the problem of evil
• Does God Really Care About Us? If so, why does he permit suffering? (A Jehovah's Witness Perspective)
• In Defense of the Free Will Theodicy
• Problem of Evil Blog
• Gregory S. Neal: "The Nature of Evil and the Irenaean Theodicy" Grace Incarnate (1988)
• Evidential Arguments from Evil
• Putting God on Trial — The Biblical Book of Job A Hegelian theodicy.
• A Collection and Critique of Responses
• A debate between theist William Lane Craig and atheist Kai Neilsen regarding the problem of evil.
• A selection of articles on good and evil in Judaism from Chabad.org
• The Problem of Evils & Predestination, (Islam), Frithjof Schuon], retrieved 11 June 2007]
• Bediuzzaman Said Nursî's Scriptural Approach to the Problem of Evil, (Islam), Yamine Mermer, retrieved 11 June 2007
• Evil, The Catholic Encyclopedia, A.B Sharpe, 1909, retrieved 11 June2007
• em>Beyond the Problem of Evil, A Graduate Level Research Paper

•  • [ e] Arguments for and against the existence of God
For	Cosmological Ontological Teleological Transcendental Christological Morality Consciousness Love Beauty Degree Desire Experience Miracles Pascal's Wager
Against	Evil Hell Nonbelief Inconsistent revelations Poor design Transcendental Noncognitivism Omnipotence Free will Atheist's Wager 747 GambitOccam's Razor